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An "Authentic Wholeness" Synthesis of Jungian and
Existential Analysis
Samuel Minier
Wittenberg University
Eclectic approaches to psychotherapy often lack cohesion due to the focus on technique and procedure rather than theory and
wholeness of both the person and of the therapy. A synthesis of Jungian and existential therapies overcomes this trend by
demonstrating how two theories may be meaningfully integrated The consolidation of the shared ideas among these theories
reveals a notion of "authentic wholeness' that may be able to stand on its own as a therapeutic objective. Reviews of both
analytical and existential psychology are given. Differences between the two are discussed, and possible reconciliation are
offered. After noting common elements in these shared approaches to psychotherapy, a hypothetical therapy based in
authentic wholeness is explored. Weaknesses and further possibilities conclude the proposal

In the last thirty years, so-called "pop
psychology" approaches to psychotherapy have
effectively demonstrated the dangers of combining
disparate therapeutic elements.
While eclectic
psychotherapy is associated with experienced clinical
work (Norcross & Prochaska, 1988; Sue, Sue, & Sue,
1994) and professionally encouraged (George &
Cristiani, 1995), eclecticism also lends itself to
haphazard and ineffective integration of therapeutic
techniques (Brammer & Shostrom, 1984; Norcross &
Prochaska, 1988; Patterson, 1980), as well as the
adoption of "every new and dramatic in thine"
(George & Cristiani, 1995).
When bits of psychotherapies are thrown
together without any cohesive theoretical background,
the human being can only be understood as a simple
collection of separate processes.
Effective
interventions become just tricks used to influence the
client's actions or thoughts, and the therapist turns into
a mechanic, trying to fix the malfunctioning machine
that is the client (Franld, 1975).
If psychotherapy is not just about "curing the sick"
but about understanding human existence, then the
therapist must enter a relationship with a client as one
who attempts to peer into a client's experience and
world. Of all psychological therapies, existential
psychology is unique in that it grew not just from a
clinical attempt to understand the mentally ill but from
many philosophical attempts to know life. Despite
some differences, these understandings all center on
the concept of the entire person and the process of
living, or "being." Being is not a convenient construct
with which to cure clients; rather, it is the basis of
existential thought.
While most therapies use
specialized technique to achieve understanding,
existentialism argues that understanding must occur
before technique can arise (May, 1983).
Of course, this lack of tight theoretical
constructs is precisely why existentialism is criticized_

Van Dusen (1962) cautions that the differences among
existential theorists are vital to the understanding of
existentialism, that "[when] existential philosophy has
hardened into a consistent dogma, life will have gone
out of it and existentialism will have lost its center in
Man" (p. 29). Similarly, May argues that the decision
to become an "existential analyst" does not involve
renouncing other views in psychology:
The existential approach is not a system of
therapy-though it makes highly important
contributions to therapy. It is not a set of techniquesthough it may give birth to them.
It is rather a
concern with understanding the structure of the human
being and his experience (1962, p.185).
May's statement is an open invitation for an
eclectic blend of existentialism and other
psychotherapies. A frame of reference that makes
existentialism more accessible and understandable
would certainly be beneficial. However, a "cut and
paste" approach is not the answer. For a coupling of
existential ideas with other theories to be useful and
valid, common links must already exist, and the
additional theory must also stress the totality of the
individual's experience and the importance of the
therapist/client relationship.
Of the many
psychotherapies that address such issues, Jungian
psychology in particular has previously been noted for
its striking similarities to existentialism. As A.J.
Ungersma, a proponent of logotherapy (Frankl's
existentialism) stated, "since Jung early in the
twentieth century defined neurosis as the suffering of a
soul that has not found its meaning,' we could call Jung
the first logotherapist!" (1961, p. 34).
An integration of Jungian and existential
ideas is a warranted and appropriate vision of eclectic
psychology and therapy, for three reasons. First, the
basic concepts of both systems are very similar or often
identical; the manner in which these concepts are
described is the dividing point between Jungians and
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existentialists. Second, these different concepts can be
used to complement and balance each other. The
Jungian portion of this synthesis expresses existential
ideas and terms in a therapeutic framework that is both
substantial and malleable. The existential portion
helps translate concrete bipolarization such as the
unconscious, introversion/extroversion, and archetypes
into fluid notions that are more adaptable to individual
cases. Roger Brooke (1991) has argued that this is in
fact what Jung intended his ideas to be, but that he
lacked the "conceptual tools to express his insights" (p.
2) in such a manner.
Finally, this synthesis is not a random
conglomeration of two theories but rather a reuniting
of ideas that support and reinforce each other; thus, a
basic concept which unites these two approaches to
psychology arises in their joining. At the core of both
existential and analytical psychology lies a notion of
awareness and gathering of the separate parts of one's
existence into an interconnected reality, an "authentic
wholeness" that may serve as a hallmark of mental
health.
Bibliography of Theories
In order to better understand analytical and
existential psychology, a review of the two theories
follows, each theory in terms of three categories:
psychology, psychopathology, and psychotherapy. This
is by no means a comprehensive review. Those
wishing to examine Jung more thoroughly are referred
to Jung (1933; 1961; 1964), as well as Read, Fordham,
and Adler (1957). In addition, Samuels (1985) offers a
rich collection of material on new directions in
analytical psychology. For a greater exploration of
existentialism, begin with Laing (1960), Ruitenbeek
(1962), Boss (1963), and Bugental (1965).
Jung's Psychology
Jung views the psyche as extremely intricate,
a multidirectional, multi temporal region (Rychlak,
1981). To understand this complicated structure, Jung
uses two main principles to categorize the mind into
manageable chunks: constellation and opposition.
Jung feels that ideas, beliefs, and assumptions about a
particular subject would constellate around a specific
emotion; these constellations, or complexes, are the
units through which the mind constructs the world
(McAdams, 1994; Rychlak, 1981).
However, opposition is also necessary to
understand a concept because "one end of a spectrum
helps to define the other" (Samuels, 1985, p. 92). One
such opposition is the distinction between conscious

and unconscious. The images and contents in the
conscious are more or less clearly defined, whereas the
material of the unconscious is vague and unclarified
(Rychlak, 1981). However, conscious and unconscious
are equal, both in ability to understand and in ability to
provide guidance.
Just as each individual has a conscious and an
unconscious, mankind also has an awareness and an
unawareness of material both within and beyond each
person.
Jung speculates that the collective
unconscious, this innate understanding of the world
shared by all people, was responsible for the recurring
themes in myths and stories (Jung, 1961, 1964). The
images around which these themes congealed are the
archetypes. Some archetypes reside specifically within
each individual, such as the persona - one's appearance
to the world - and the shadow - one's hidden,
undesirable side (Jung, 1964; Samuels, 1985;
McAdams, 1994).
Jung emphasizes a principle of equivalence to
moderate between this constellation and opposition
(Rychlak, 1981), . Many complexes should be present,
with no one dominating the individual's psyche.
Likewise, bipolarization in life needs to be balance.
One of the most important balancing acts takes place
between ego (self-perception) and shadow (selfdeception), so that these opposites are reconciled in an
accepting manner (Read, Forham, & Adler, 1957).
Only by integrating complexes, opposites, and
archetypes together can one become a whole, unified
person, what Jung called the Self (Jung, 1933, 1964).
Jung's View of Psychopathology
Jung sees a patient as "one who [had] betrayed his
wholeness in the interests of some sub-aspect of
himself' (Barton, 1974, p.95). This betrayal may occur
in several ways. An overinflated complex may
consume more and more of a person's time and energy,
or the bipolarization in one's life may be so strongly
separated from each other that they become
incompatible (Rychlak, 1981).
However, the
undifferentiated unconscious, in the natural striving for
balance, pushes repressed issues upward to break into
the unconscious. If the material can be integrated into
one's understanding, the Self may be attained. This
material is usually understood through a symbol.
The unconscious information may be too
repellant or inconsistent with one's self-understanding
to be accepted.
Projection and other defense
mechanism may be used, so that the notion is cast
away from the self and onto another object; this object
becomes a symbol of the unwanted knowledge. Thus,
part of the Self is denied.
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Jung's System of Therapy
Samuels (1991) argues that terms such as
"mentally ill" result in a loss of patient individuality
and true patient understanding. Similarly, Jung writes
that, "we should not try to get rid' of a neurosis, but
rather to experience what it means, what it has to
teach, what its purpose is . " (1964. P.170). Barton
also states that "the purpose of Jungian analysis is to
make conscious that which is unconscious and to bring
into the open that which has been shut off' (1974,
p.110). In other words, analytical psychology sees
"mental illness" as an indication that the patient is
attempting to become whole.
To ease this "opening-up," Jung envisions
four stages to therapy: (a) confession, (b) elucidation,
© education, and (d) transformation (1933).
Confession is a catharsis in which one becomes aware
of unconscious knowledge. Elucidation involves a
clarification of this material and a discovery of what it
means to the individual. Education is a changing
process focused on both the "mental illness" and the
behaviors that facilitate it. Transformation is a
specialized fourth stage that addresses the total
development of the Self. This sequence is only a
sketch, for it is likely that portions of all four stages
will be occurring simultaneously (Rychlak, 1981).
Jung comments that, "it is advisable for the physician
not to have too fixed a goal . . . the shoe that fits one
person pinches another" (1933, p. 60). Instead, the
focus should be placed on the dialectic relationship
between patient and therapist, a "symbolic soul
meeting" (Barton, 1974; Rychlak, 1981).
The necessity of treating each case differently
leads Jung away from devising specific therapeutic
techniques. Jung feels that all psychic material was
wrapped around symbols, so patients are encouraged to
write, draw, and act in other manners that generate
unconscious imagery. The resulting imagery should be
focused on and intensely amplified. Within a dialectic
relationship, these examinations reveal unconscious
meanings and how to create a whole from them.
Existential Psychology
Existential psychology began as a reaction to
the objective views that dominated psychology
(McAdams, 1994). The existential psychologists,
despite varied interests and techniques, all believe that
psychology's starting point must be the individual.
Existentialism rejects the fragmentation of the
individual into separate components and sections;
instead, the entire process of what it means to be
human must be considered. Binswanger uses the term

Dasein to describe "a being whose essence is to be-inthe-world" (Needleman, 1963, p. 67). This "being-inthe-world" means that the world and the individual
have no meaning without each other (McAdams,
1994).
If being-in-the-world characterizes human
existence, then a notion of non-being must be
considered, for "to grasp what it means to exist, one
needs to grasp the fact that he might not exist" (May,
1958, pp. 47-48). Death or non-being is an utter lack
of Dasein, a Nothingness that produces Angst, the utter
fear of separation and non-existence (Ruitenbeek,
1962). Angst is inevitable and, ironically, both
threatening and necessary.
Man's awareness of being and non-being is
needed to comprehend his "thrownness," the condition
that he is indifferently cast into and out of the world
(Bugental, 1965). However, this awareness of man's
condition reveals also his potential for action.
Ultimate control is not attainable, but man does have
the freedom and responsibility to make authentic
choices within his thrownness (Bugental, 1965;
Rychlak, 1981). Authenticity is "a way of being in the
world in which one's being is in harmony with the
being of the world itself' (Bugental, 1965, p.33).
Existential Psychopathology
The recognition of uncertainty and
thrownness is likely to cause existential anxiety, which
is simply characteristic of being. Existential anxiety is
normal and health if " lone can} accept the
responsibility for choice but recognize the potentiality
of tragedy" (Bugental, 1965, p.24). When existential
anxiety cannot be accepted, that anxiety becomes
neurotic. Though conceptualized in different ways,
neurotic anxiety in general may be understood as a fear
of Dasein loss. Some may suffer from a "stuck"
Dasein, in which the freedom to make decisions is
gone (Needleman, 1963); others may feel ontological
insecurity, in which they cannot take existence for
granted and contrive ways of forcing life to be more
"real" (Laing, 1960). In addition, neurotic anxiety may
also be caused by a perceived inability to understand
and interact in the world, what Frank! called "the
existential vacuum" (1975, p. 90). In these different
manners, the "mentally ill" inauthentically perceive
their world and deny the true possibilities of their
Dasein.
Existential Therapy
In existential psychology, terms such as
psychopathology are seen as dehumanizing labels

46
(Bugental, 1965; Laing, 1960). Instead of a cure,
existential psychotherapy is understood as a quest for
the authentic being-in-the-world that the patient has
lost. Implicit in this search is the client's personal
discovery of Dasein. The therapist may guide and
encourage, but it must ultimately be the client who
regains his or her Dasein. This involves many tasks
the client must complete, including recognizing the
inauthenticity of his/her current world-view and taking
the responsibility to make his/her own personal choice.
Because of the emphasis on each client's Dasein as
unique and specific, few generalizations can be made
about therapy. Any general, formulaic approach to the
client is seen as a devaluation of the experiencing
relationship between client and therapist.
Some attention has been paid to the
"procedure" of creating what Bugental calls "the
authentic presence" of the therapist in relation to the
client. Whatever techniques the therapist chooses to
use must deepen the understanding between therapist
and client. May writes that, "psychological dynamisms
always take their meaning from . . . the patient's own,
immediate life" (1983, p.154). Similarly, Bugental
addresses the need for the therapist to understand that
immediate life without taking away the patient's
responsibility for the existential crisis intimately
(1965).
Jung and Existentialism
It is important to note that the proposed
synthesis is not an attempt to "weld together" Jung and
existentialism into one large personality theory. The
constructs underlying the specific components of
personality within each theory are unified and
contained so that additions would be confusing and
often contradictory. Nonetheless, the understandings
of the two theories in relation to the basic nature of
human beings are very similar and seem to present a
notion of "authentic wholeness" as the key to a healthy,
well-balanced life.
In addition, both analytic and existential
psychologists emphasize the importance of addressing
the individuality of each client's "authentic wholeness"
in clinical practice.
It is through this specific
understanding that these approaches may be united.
Differences
The main point of divergence between Jung
and the existentialists lies in their manner of
theoretical conceptualization. Existential writings are
often phrased in ways that can only be fully understood
when applied to particular examples. For instance,

how can one define Dasein in general? While the
phrase 'being-in-the-world" is useful, a general
understanding of the idea remains elusive. In contrast,
the Jungian divide psyche and experience into many
distinct sections through the principles of constellation
and opposition. Rigidly defined structures such as the
complex or the personality types may result in a
narrow or limited examination of personality and
pathology.
So, if these theories seem to have authentic
wholeness at their core, how should their divergent
approaches be studied? That is, should existentialism
be examined for its undifferentiated Jungian ideas, or
should analytical psychology be scrutinized for
constrained elements of existentialism? While both
perspectives are useful, the primary examination will
be of Jung's complicated and confusing taxonomy in
relation to the existential ideas that flicker in and out
of his work. It is difficult to address existentialism's
lack of concrete categories when existential
psychologists cite this "deficiency" as a benefit to their
system. Jung, on the other hand, addresses the need
for a phenomenological understanding of each
individual, coupled with the scientific division of
knowledge, what Brooke (1991) calls "the Cartesian
separation of Knower and known" (p. 6).
Existential examples of this division (e.g.,
Franid's psychogenic, somatogenic, and noogenic
neuroses) effectively demonstrate the importance of
conceptual categories. For better or worse, Western
science has developed in this classifying manner, and a
rejection of this approach would be counterproductive.
However, Jung is often criticized for hinting at an
innate human experience that is beyond scientific
understanding and yet at other times wrapping it
completely within scientific reductionism. This dual
presentation of what Brooke (1991) calls "the natural
scientific" and "the poetic" often causes confusion and
rejection of Jungian ideas among both psychologists
and the general public.
Jung's unclear blend of phenomenology and
rationalism produces several results. Existentialists
have turned away from Jung's ideas due to a perceived
overemphasis on the reality of concepts and symbols.
The terms "libido" and "psychic energy" seem tied to
biological drives and are reminiscent back to Freud's
notions of reductionistic determinism (Brooke, 1991).
Furthermore, Brooke contends that Jungian analysts do
not often attempt to reconcile Jung's two views:
Although Jungian analysts tend to eschew
reductionism (or at least that is the impression they
like to give) there does seem to be a widely held view
that the "truths" which emerge from analytical
practice are in some sense provisional (1991, p. 5).
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In addition, a popular aspect of Jungian psychology,
the personality typology, is also one of the most
objectifying. The very characteristics that make it
appealing to empiricists and the public are the same
characteristics that clash with existential ideas and
even with some of Jung's other writings (Jung, 1933).
This "confusion through conceptualization" is
readily evident in two specific areas of analytical
psychology. One is the distinction between conscious
and unconscious. Existentialism resists the personal
unconscious as an objective reality because the
difference between conscious and unconscious is, from
the existential point of view, an arbitrary dividing line
(Rychlak, 1981).
Furthermore, relying on the
unconscious for guidance seems an inauthentic way of
life, a forsaking of choice for innate "instincts" and
"drives" (Rychlak, 1981). Binswanger argues that
emphasis must remain on the conscious as the primary
force in activating the human experience (Needleman,
1963).
Similarly, Boss comments that it is
"unnecessary to go beyond immediate experience"
(1963, p. 94); labeling something unconscious is
attempting to understand that which does not exist, for
as soon as it exists (i.e., is known to us), then it must
be conscious! In other words, there may be such a
thing as the unconscious, but it is concealed from our
understanding, so we should "let concealment be the
secret it is" (Boss, 1963, p. 101).
If the personal unconscious is a vague
unawareness that we cannot define, then the collective
unconscious and the archetypes within it are simply
subjective misrepresentations of "Dasein-experiences"
common to many people (Boss, 1963). To the
existentialists, the emphasis must remain on each
unique, existing Dasein; if some individuals
throughout history have experienced being in the same
way, there is no need to consider the source of these
commonalties as shared. Such a collective force
appears to be the equivalent of species instincts. Such
a notion angered Frank!, who, when addressing the
religious elements of the archetypes, wrote:
What sort of religion would that be - a
religion to which I am driven, driven just as I
am
driven to sex? As for myself, I would
not give a damn for a religiousness that I
owed to
some "religious drive" (1975,
1164)To be authentic, intensely personal experiences such as
religion must come from "the personal center of the
individual man rather than an impersonal pool of
images shared by mankind" (Frank!, 1975, p. 65).

Possible Reconciliation
Some have suggested that Jung's confusion
and contradiction springs from his sometimes dull and
complicated writing style (Brooke, 1991). However, an
even more basic problem may be that Jung simply gets
tied up in his terminology. Brooke writes that, "Jung
saw and understood as an existential phenomenologist
but he lacked the conceptual tools to express his
insights in a phenomenologically rigorous way" (1991,
p.2 ). Jung was witnessing integrated phenomena in
people but had no way of expressing these views except
through the natural scientific understanding that
dominated the time.
Such views cannot fully
encompass notions of balance and experience, even
symbolically.
This does not mean, however, that these
"empirical" understandings of authentic wholeness
should simply be ignored. Rather, such constructs
should be used as broad categories for understanding
phenomena rather than interpreted literally. Jung is
inconsistent on this subject, but it seems clear from his
later writings that he encouraged latitude within a
defined theory: "Naturally, a doctor must be familiar
with the so-called methods.' But he must guard
against falling into any specific, routine approach"
(Jung, 1961, p.130). Jung's ideas can be used as tools
through which the analyst may begin to understand the
patient. However, the therapists should never try to
force the patient's experience into a construct that does
not fit him or her. Jung's conceptualizations are
simply meant to be stepping stones leading to the
meeting of therapist and client as two equal human
beings. (Jung, 1961).
An ironic example of the power of Jung to dig
into the heart of a matter is Peterson's (1992) use of
personality typology to examine differences between
Jung and Frank!. Peterson argues that the theorists'
differing views on the discovery of meaning can be
better understood when one recognizes Frank! as an
extrovert and Jung as an introvert. Both Jung and
Frankl believe that "meaning is found, not invented"
(Peterson, 1992, p.37); the difference is that they
looked in different areas. Jung searched for the nature
of meaning inside each person's psyche, while Franld
emphasized commitment to something outside the self.
Thus, there is not a choice between Jung's meaning or
Franld's meaning but a recognition that "each type,
giving true testimony of its own perception, will have
two different stories to tell" (Peterson, 1992, p. 37).
Not only does Peterson offer a connection between
Jung and Frank!, he also shows how a typology can be
used without being restrictive. Jung and Frankl are not
simply labeled "introvert" and "extrovert" but are
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understood through these terms, which in turn leads to
greater understanding.
In this light, the examination of the
unconscious becomes more than a reliance on blind
instinct and a rejection of independent free will. Boss's
(1963) argument that the complexities of
"concealment" (the unconscious) should be left secret
prevents the experiencing being from delving deeper
into his/her Dasein, from examining the parts that
cannot be fully understood. However, these confusing
experiences may eventually make sense. Van Dusen
writes, "What to most analysts is unconscious and thus
removed, to the existential analyst is present though as
yet undifferentiated" (1962, p.37). The implication is
that the elements of the unconscious are very much
part of one's being. What is undifferentiated may
eventually be fully understood or integrated into the
personality: "[for] Jung, the unconscious is that
absence which nevertheless calls for appropriation so
that the one-sidedness and limitations of consciousness
may be compensated" (Brooke, 1991, p. 135). Jung's
understanding of the unconscious is unclear and often
overstated, but his contribution that unawareness may
become known, and thus balanced with previous
awareness, is valuable.
Again, in the case of the collective
unconscious and the archetypes, Jung's contradictions
do not warrant outright rejection. Jung's basic mistake
is his failure to consistently delineate the archetypal
image, which may vary, from the archetype itself
(Brooke, 1991). If this distinction is kept in mind, the
archetypes lose their concrete separateness from
individual experience and become ontological "sources
of the typical actions, reactions, and experiences that
characterize the human species" (Brooke, 1991, p.
159).
In this understanding of the archetypes, there
is no need for Franid's bristling against "drives,"
religious or otherwise. Just because there are basic
functions through which the - human psyche
understands or the Dasein experiences does not mean
that an individual's relationship to God, Mother, or the
Hero lacks an intrinsically personal nature. Rollo May
recognizes that it is a basic part of being-in-the-world
to symbolize experience through myths, which are
innately archetypal: "Each of us, but virtue of our
pattern of myths, participates in these archetypes; they
are the structure of human existence" (May, 1991, p.
38).
Commonalties
When Jung's ideas are understood as general
experiences that differ in specifics through each

person's being, a greater understanding of the total
From such an
human experience is gained.
understanding arises practices and ideas that
emphasize both analytical and existential psychology's
contributions to psychopathology and therapy. The
guiding point of these contributions should be the goal
of therapy. Both Jung and the existentialists state that
while each individual's needs will differ, all people
strive to make sense out of their place in the world.
While Jung talks about meaning gained
through myth (Jung, 1961), and Frankl discusses
meaning gained from suffering (Frankl, 1969), both
are discussing a need for people to understand
themselves and their world. As Peterson (1992) points
out, Jung focuses inward and Frankl aims outward, but
both emphasize each individual's finding authentic
meaning in his or her own way.
This reliance on the Self to find meaning, as
from one's conscious, also generates anxiety. Jung and
Sartre agree that such an existence is often filled with
anguish (Shelburne, 1983). This anguish over the
search for Self and meaning can lead to self-deception
and a rejection of one's responsibility for this search.
Some people may form complexes around the
hardships in their lives, and others will live "in bad
faith" by allowing popular opinion to determine their
decisions; in both cases, the individual is neglecting
self-unification and self-with-world unification.
Through individuation or authentic living,
anguish is confronted, and "it is in the confrontation
with the shadow that the person must face
inconsistencies in his value structure. Through this
process bad faith would be exposed and worked
through" (Shelbourne, 1983, p.64). Only through the
individual's realization of Self as both cause and
potential cure of his/her misery may authentic
wholeness be reached.
For those who cry out for help on this journey
to authentic wholeness, Jung and existentialism
caution the helper (the therapist) to recognize fully
what the client is: a human being as potentially strong
or weak as the therapist. Such a similar being must be
treated with the respect due to an equal. As
Binswanger states, "[the therapist] will therefore not
degrade the patient to an object toward which he is
subject, but he will see in him an existential partner"
(1962, p. 20); analytical psychology aims at a similar
relationship, in which "patient and therapist sit
together, walk and talk together . . . and engage in a
wide variety of activities in which they ask themselves
what is the truth of the patient's life" (Barton, 1974,
p.112). The therapist may have greater training or
knowledge than a client, but the therapist never
presumes to understand the client better than the client
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does him/herself. Thus, the emphasis focuses back on
the patient.
Guided and encouraged by the therapist, the
client makes these discoveries through a variety of
exercises, the specifics of which vary from patient to
patient. In analytical therapy, this involves attaching
significance to "symbols of unification" (Barton, 1974),
while existentialism stresses the exploration of
meaning in actions involving one's being (Frankl,
1969). In both cases, the essential nature of the client's
actions involves a "development of inner resources"
and "creative exercises of freedom" (Shelburne, 1983,
p.58). The patient is encouraged to create and examine
symbols and meanings in life.
For example,
perspectives of dreams in each theory are viewed from
each particular patient's Self or Dasein so that, except
for slight amplification, the dream means exactly what
it appears to mean for each client (Barton, 1974;
Binswanger, 1962). It is through such intensive
examinations that the client can exercise the free will
to discover the meaning in his/her Dasein or Self.
An Authentic-Wholeness Model of Psychotherapy
Behind the differences and agreements of
existentialism and Jung, there is a unified theme, a
notion of "mental health" as existing within the
authentically-whole person. What might therapy that
focused on this idea look like? Who might benefit the
most from it? It seems likely that an authenticwholeness approach would best suit those who suffer
from what Jung called "the general neurosis of our
time" (1933, p.61). Disintegration of the self, a feeling
of inability to function in the world, a longing for
fulfillment: all these phrases may describe those who
could benefit. Disorders of anxiety and affect certainly
fall into this realm. However, as will be discussed
later, this theory of treatment may not work well with
those whose psychopathology involves severe delusion
or psychosis, for in these situations the necessary
interaction with the therapist may not be possible.
At the beginning of authentic wholeness
therapy, a connection between therapist and client
must be established. The client must understand that
s/he will be as responsible for the direction and
progress of the therapy as the therapist. The therapist
may have an idea of how the journey to the client's Self
should proceed, but the therapist makes no
assumptions that will overrule the authority of the
client. The therapist should expect the treatment to
roughly follow Jung's four stages of therapy.
However, to some extent, the steps will also
occur continuously, and the therapist must be aware of
this. Suppose, for example, a client with a compulsion

for hand-washing begins to identify the compulsion
with a fear of being regarded as dirty by others
(elucidation) and yet also recognizes the dirt and sweat
on his hands as a natural part of himself (a symbol of
transformation and integration). The therapist must
allow the patient the freedom to both elucidate and
transform but must also stress the importance of truly
breaking the compulsion and the danger of substituting
a lowered self-esteem (a unipolar symbol of Dirt as
Self) for the compulsion. In this manner, the therapist
allows the client to maintain his equal partnership in
the relationship while not denying the therapist's role
as "meaning-transformer" in therapy (Barton, 1974, p.
268).
Careful work by client and therapist is
necessary through the confession stage of the therapy.
The true heart of the client's problem needs to be
reached in this stage, for only when both parties in the
therapeutic relationship are aware of the true nature of
the problem can the place of inauthentic or partial
wholeness in the client's life be understood (Jung,
1933). The therapist must be especially attentive in
this section of the therapy, so that a superficial aspect
of far greater neurosis is not mistaken for the source of
the client's suffering (Jung, 1933). Once this source
has been pulled out and is examined by therapist and
client in the elucidation and education phases, the
freedom and responsibility of the client should be
encouraged frequently.
The client needs to understand that s/he has
the ability and indeed the duty to accept and
understand this "neurosis" in the most authentic
manner possible. This can be the first step in finding
integrated, connected meanings in the other
experiences of the person's experience or Self.
In the search for meaning, the therapist is
likely to see the client wrap understanding of a person,
experience, or Self around some object (Jung, 1964).
This is not a bad thing, since the client is aware that
this symbolism is occurring. For example, if a client
ties the mean, nasty acts of his childhood to his older
brother, the patient is in effect casting his undesirable
Shadow onto the brother. Even if the brother did have
a corrupting influence, both client and therapist need
to realize that his symbolism is actually a rejection of
the integration of Shadow and Self. Such a projection
must be worked through by constantly pushing the
client to be responsibly authentic and not use freedom
of choice to ignore an aspect of Self (Frankl, 1969).
However, the therapist must also be careful
not to push the client away from a symbol that the
therapist does not personally agree with, particularly in
matters of religion (Jung, 1933). The understanding of
authentically appropriate symbols for the client can
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only be reached through an equal and open dialogue
between client and therapist (Bugental, 1965).
Symbols of authentic wholeness can be
generated and explored through several processes, such
as dream amplifications, painting, and writing. The
emphasis on material that comes from the individual
enforces the client's notion of Self as creator and finder
of meaning (Read, Fordham, and Adler, 1957). Again,
the therapist must be careful not to view the dreams or
other unique work from a pre-designed frame of
reference. The only frame of reference through which
these works can be understood is the client (Jung,
1933; May, 1991).
These activities are the first steps toward the
achievement of authentic wholeness. This
involves the integration of the various symbols and
meanings that have been discovered into one complete
Self. The unification of the Self, however, is not
attainable without a conscious decision by the client to
do so. The elements that rise from the unconscious
mean nothing if the client does not have the free will
and courage to face them. This transformative stage
may take a long time to reach.
Authentic wholeness therapy, like Jungian
and existential analysis, may be a long, timeconsuming process. However, not all the client's work
must be done with the therapist. If the client moves
into the transformative stage and is actively pulling
together the parts of his/her existence into a
consolidated meaning, s/he may be ready to
discontinue therapy while continuing to become
authentically whole.
Such a decision must be
discussed between client and therapist. Authentic
wholeness is not just a goal of therapy but also a goal
of healthy life overall. Ideally, the client will continue
in these explorations long after treatment has ended.
Conclusions
The previous speculations about an
"authentically wholeness" - based therapy are just that:
theoretical speculations that have yet to be empirically
validated. For that reason, several weaknesses within
these ideas are evident. As stated earlier, authentic
wholeness therapy may only be appropriate for certain
populations. The severely mentally ill may have
extreme difficulty understanding notions of "integrated
experience," and thus are not potential clients for this
therapy. As both Jung (1957) and Laing (1960) point
out, there may be important symbols and elements of
existence present in the seemingly random acts of a
schizophrenic. However, schizophrenic delusions and
other profound disturbances are probably not reachable
by the outlined model (i.e. the confessional step). This

limitation is particularly frustrating because it is often
the extremely mentally ill who are most dehumanized
Further research in the
in their treatment.
understanding of the severely delusional will be
necessary before an approach to their authentic
wholeness may be undertaken.
The degree of Self-disorganization presents
another potential flaw. Therapists who are concerned
with over-influencing the client's experiences and
symbols may place too much emphasis on choice and
For clients
responsibility early in the therapy.
disconnected from themselves and their existence, this
challenge may be too much for their limited resources.
These patients should be slowly integrated into a plan
in which both their efforts and the therapist's have
equally important consequences. This also brings up
the consideration of time.
The journey toward authentic-wholeness may
require a longer time commitment than many patients
and therapists desire. The is of time should be
carefully considered by both parties before therapy is
entered.
Finally, the lack of case studies for this
hypothesis is possibly the greatest weakness. Without
specific features, the general notion of "authenticwholeness" is a hazy one that may edge toward the
"plug-in" eclecticism which was criticized earlier.
Case studies, by providing concrete examples of
concepts, would be the best way to address this
problem. Future investigation and clarification of
authentic-wholeness may open the avenue for
empirical research.
In spite of these weaknesses, the proposed
integration shows potential for further study and
consideration. The reasons for continued exploration
of authentic wholeness are threefold. First, it offers a
potential new therapy for both clients and therapists
who want a treatment that centers around the whole
individual. Second, this hypothesis highlights a notion
that helps explain and clarify two often-confusing
theories. Even if authentic wholeness therapy is
ineffective, further explorations of similarities between
analytical and existential psychology could continue to
illuminate both theories. Finally, this hypothesis is an
example of eclecticism in which the theories are not
randomly tossed together but are instead carefully
studied for similarities.
Once such similarities are discovered,
subsequent empirical work may strengthen this united
base. Hopefully, this notion of authentic wholeness
addresses not only the necessity of wholeness of the
client, but also wholeness of the therapy as well.
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